M. F. Abernathy
2006-04-23 23:17:22 UTC
IRVIN FRAZIER, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWOODS STATE PRISON et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action 06-0096 (JAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20832
April 17, 2006, Decided
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COUNSEL: IRVIN FRAZIER, Plaintiff, Pro se, Rahway, New Jersey.
JUDGES: JOEL A. PISANO, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: JOEL A. PISANO
OPINION:
JOEL A. PISANO, District Judge
Plaintiff Irvin Frazier (hereinafter "Plaintiff") currently confined at
the East Jersey State Prison, Rahway, New Jersey, seeks to bring this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit of
indigence and his application to New Jersey Department of Corrections
for his institutional account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a) (1998). Plaintiff also submitted for filing his complaint
(hereinafter "Complaint").
Plaintiff named the following parties as defendants in this action:
Southwoods State Prison; Judge Linda G. Baxton; employees (identified
as "co-workers") of G.P.S. (identified as "Global Polite Satellite");
the Administration of New Jersey State Prison, together with the
prison's dentist and correctional officer Hutcherson; Doctor
Mactindale, identified as "psychotrist" at the Northen State Prison;
the Administration [*2] and Office of Internal Affairs at the Rahway
State Prison; and John Doe, a nurse at the East Jersey State Prison.
Plaintiff's Complaint is accompanied by a substantial number of
attachments, plus two physical exhibits, namely, Plaintiff's toothpaste
container and a matchbook with matches used by Plaintiff as toothpicks.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Baxton "had a tracking device placed in .
. . Plaintiff's tooth . . . to play with . . . Plaintiff['s] head."
Compl. § 4(b). Plaintiff also asserts that employees of G.P.S. "were
allowed to play with [Plaintiff's] head through the [electronic] chip."
Id. § 4(c). Plaintiff further states that the Office of Internal
Affairs at the Southwoods State Prison "violated [Plaintiff's] rights
[by] knowing [that] the eye was tracking Plaintiff [but failing to]
help [Plaintiff to] retrieve [a] cuff key" (which, apparently, had some
connection to the "eye"), while the prison's Administration "allowed
the tracking unit [to] play with [Plaintiff's] thoughts [and] play with
[his] head." Id. at 3.
In addition, Plaintiff maintains that the Administration of New Jersey
Stay Prison "let[] the tracker function with [Plaintiff's] [*3]
body," while (1) the prison's dentist did "not put[] on record that
[Plaintiff] received a [tooth] filling [which was] a tracking device,"
and (2) officer Hutcherson was "playing with [Plaintiff's] actions."
Id. at 3-4. Finally, Plaintiff claims that "psychotrist" Mactindale
"forced [Plaintiff to take] medication [after Plaintiff] . . .
documented that his head rate was 152," and Nurse Doe "overdosed
[Plaintiff] with psychotropic medication." Id. at 4-5.
The alleged satellite tracking caused Plaintiff to lose weight, made
Plaintiff flatulent, controlled Plaintiff's physical movements,
attached Plaintiff's mind, read Plaintiff's claims and manifested
itself in Plaintiff's imagination as a "spirit." Id. at 13. In an
effort to obtain "forensic evidence" of the "eye," Plaintiff used the
matches from the matchbook to obtain the substance which, according to
Plaintiff, was (1) constantly deposited between Plaintiff's teeth
through food and toothpaste, and (2) enabled the tracking. See id.
Plaintiff's Complaint concludes with an observation that, "if
[Plaintiff] bring[s] it [all] to [the attention of] Administration,
[the Administration] will ship [*4] [Plaintiff] to [a] mental
[hospital.] And NASA plays a big part in shutting them down. But to no
avail." Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),
Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996).
Congress's purpose in enacting the PLRA was "primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act . . . many of which are routinely dismissed as legally
frivolous." Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996).
A crucial part of the congressional plan for curtailing meritless
prisoner suits is the requirement, embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), that a court must dismiss, at the earliest
practicable time, any prisoner actions that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from immune defendants.
However, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must
be mindful to construe it liberally in favor [*5] of the plaintiff.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court
should "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however,
lend credit to a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal
conclusions." Id.
B. Fanciful, Fantastic and Delusional Claims
The Supreme Court explained that a complaint is frivolous within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if the complaint lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Section 1915(d)'s term
"frivolous," when applied to a complaint, embraces not only inarguable
legal conclusions but also fanciful factual allegations. See id. The
Section accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the power to
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions [*6] are clearly
baseless. See id.; Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). In accordance with the Supreme Court's
guidance articulated in Neitzke and Denton, courts across the nation
dismissed claims based on sets of facts that were qualified as
"fanciful, fantastic and delusional." See Simmons v. Payne, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6796 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2006) (an assertion of a vast
conspiracy by all levels of the state government and federal government
was manifestly frivolous); Huey v. Raymond, 53 Fed. Appx. 329 (6th Cir.
2002) (an inmate's claim that his food was poisoned by numerous prison
employees, resulting in various ailments, was properly dismissed as
irrational, wholly beyond belief, and the product of delusion); Brock
v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952 (4th Cir. Va. 1997) (court rejected the
inmate's claims that he was being poisoned by an ingredient in the
prison pancake syrup); Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. Okla.
1995) (a claim that all judges of the circuit and an attorney conspired
to deny prisoner's access to the court was properly denied as
frivolous); Allen v. Children's Servs. Div., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34415
[*7] (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1993) (a father's complaint alleging that the
entire children's services department engaged in sexual conduct with
his daughter was frivolous); Taylor v. Bunnell, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
16889 (9th Cir. June 28, 1993) (dismissal of prisoner's claim alleging
that prison authorities drained his body fluids with carpet cleaning
machine was affirmed because his claims were fanciful, fantastic,
delusional, and clearly lacked an arguable basis in law or fact);
Callahan v. Beaman, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4211 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1993)
(where the complaint alleged that the conspiracy was part of a larger
scheme with the Seventh Day Adventists to get full control of one of
the plaintiffs, the district court properly found the complaint to be
frivolous and dismissed the action); Punchard v. New Mexico, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1923 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992) (inmate's complaint, in which
he claimed state officials had no right to hold or charge him because
he was the head of a foreign government, the Emperor of the Royal
Democratic State of Continental Africa Kingdom, was frivolous); O'Neal
v. Unknown Oakland Circuit Judge, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9972 [*8]
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2006) (where the claim asserted prolonged judicial
conspiracy, the "allegations had a paranoid quality that made them
difficult to accept as true").
In the same vein, the courts in the Third Circuit dismissed fanciful,
fantastic and delusional allegations. See Armstead v. Briggs, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3588 (D. Del. Feb. 17, 2004) (dismissing the claim
requesting that the court set up an appointment for the plaintiff with
President George W. Bush so that she could tell him that she had filed
a lawsuit seeking his permanent appointment as the President of the
United States); Noble v. Becker, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 480 (D. Del.
Jan. 15, 2004) (the claims that the government officials and others had
engaged in a vast conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights was
clearly delusional); Williams v. Werster, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (plaintiff's claim that he had uncovered
evidence of a conspiracy by the former mayor to commit sabotage and
espionage in order to establish ecclesiastical law and in some way
interfering with U.S. commerce were fanciful, fantastic, or
delusional); Robinson v. Love, 155 F.R.D. 535, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7503 (E.D. Pa. 1994) [*9] (where plaintiff alleged that his relatives,
neighbors, and friends were being held hostage by prison staff members,
and that he was subjected to witchcraft and attempts to poison him with
cyanide, the allegations were described as fanciful, fantastic, or
delusional scenarios). In accord with the above-cited decisions by the
courts in this Circuit and other national courts, this Court holds that
Plaintiff's Complaint describes fanciful, fantastic, or delusional
scenarios which stand genuinely outside the common experience of
humankind, and should be dismissed as irrational or wholly incredible.
n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Moreover, Plaintiff's claim against Judge Baxton cannot be
entertained since Judge Baxton is protected by absolute immunity with
respect to all acts that the Judge performs within her judicial
capacity. The well-established doctrine of judicial immunity has been
adhered to by the Supreme Court for more than a century. See Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871). Judicial immunity bestows
upon judges absolute immunity from suit for acts performed in their
judicial capacity. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S. Ct.
496, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1985). Judicial immunity is "essential to
protect the integrity of the judicial process" because it allows judges
to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without fear that
they will be subjected to vexatious or frivolous litigation. Id. at
200. Similarly, claims against G.P.S. cannot be entertained since
G.P.S. is not a state actor. To recover against a defendant under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted
under "color of [state] law" to deprive him of a right secured by the
federal Constitution or laws. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 1983 does not create substantive
rights; rather, it provides an avenue of recovery for the deprivation
of established federal constitutional and statutory rights. See Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996); Groman, 47 F.3d at 633.
"The color of state law . . . is a threshold issue; there is no
liability under [Section] 1983 for those not acting under color of
law." Id. at 638. The color of state law element in a section 1983
action requires that "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of
[the plaintiff's rights] be fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482
(1982). For the conduct to be "fairly attributable" to the State, (1)
the deprivation must be caused by (a) the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or (b) by a rule of conduct imposed by
it or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and (2) the
defendant must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor,
either because the person (a) is a state official, (b) acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or (c)
performed conduct otherwise chargeable to the State. See id. at 936-39.
None of Plaintiff's allegations suggest that G.P.S. is a state actor.
Moreover, this Court's attempts to detect such entity as "Global Polite
Satellite" proved fruitless leading the Court to conclude that the
entity is nothing but a figment of Plaintiff's imagination.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [*10]
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Since
Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim bearing no relations to experiences
of humankind and describing fanciful, fantastic, or delusional
scenarios, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
Dated: April 17, 2006
Defendants.
Civil Action 06-0096 (JAP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20832
April 17, 2006, Decided
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COUNSEL: IRVIN FRAZIER, Plaintiff, Pro se, Rahway, New Jersey.
JUDGES: JOEL A. PISANO, United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: JOEL A. PISANO
OPINION:
JOEL A. PISANO, District Judge
Plaintiff Irvin Frazier (hereinafter "Plaintiff") currently confined at
the East Jersey State Prison, Rahway, New Jersey, seeks to bring this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in forma pauperis without prepayment of fees
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff submitted his affidavit of
indigence and his application to New Jersey Department of Corrections
for his institutional account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a) (1998). Plaintiff also submitted for filing his complaint
(hereinafter "Complaint").
Plaintiff named the following parties as defendants in this action:
Southwoods State Prison; Judge Linda G. Baxton; employees (identified
as "co-workers") of G.P.S. (identified as "Global Polite Satellite");
the Administration of New Jersey State Prison, together with the
prison's dentist and correctional officer Hutcherson; Doctor
Mactindale, identified as "psychotrist" at the Northen State Prison;
the Administration [*2] and Office of Internal Affairs at the Rahway
State Prison; and John Doe, a nurse at the East Jersey State Prison.
Plaintiff's Complaint is accompanied by a substantial number of
attachments, plus two physical exhibits, namely, Plaintiff's toothpaste
container and a matchbook with matches used by Plaintiff as toothpicks.
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Baxton "had a tracking device placed in .
. . Plaintiff's tooth . . . to play with . . . Plaintiff['s] head."
Compl. § 4(b). Plaintiff also asserts that employees of G.P.S. "were
allowed to play with [Plaintiff's] head through the [electronic] chip."
Id. § 4(c). Plaintiff further states that the Office of Internal
Affairs at the Southwoods State Prison "violated [Plaintiff's] rights
[by] knowing [that] the eye was tracking Plaintiff [but failing to]
help [Plaintiff to] retrieve [a] cuff key" (which, apparently, had some
connection to the "eye"), while the prison's Administration "allowed
the tracking unit [to] play with [Plaintiff's] thoughts [and] play with
[his] head." Id. at 3.
In addition, Plaintiff maintains that the Administration of New Jersey
Stay Prison "let[] the tracker function with [Plaintiff's] [*3]
body," while (1) the prison's dentist did "not put[] on record that
[Plaintiff] received a [tooth] filling [which was] a tracking device,"
and (2) officer Hutcherson was "playing with [Plaintiff's] actions."
Id. at 3-4. Finally, Plaintiff claims that "psychotrist" Mactindale
"forced [Plaintiff to take] medication [after Plaintiff] . . .
documented that his head rate was 152," and Nurse Doe "overdosed
[Plaintiff] with psychotropic medication." Id. at 4-5.
The alleged satellite tracking caused Plaintiff to lose weight, made
Plaintiff flatulent, controlled Plaintiff's physical movements,
attached Plaintiff's mind, read Plaintiff's claims and manifested
itself in Plaintiff's imagination as a "spirit." Id. at 13. In an
effort to obtain "forensic evidence" of the "eye," Plaintiff used the
matches from the matchbook to obtain the substance which, according to
Plaintiff, was (1) constantly deposited between Plaintiff's teeth
through food and toothpaste, and (2) enabled the tracking. See id.
Plaintiff's Complaint concludes with an observation that, "if
[Plaintiff] bring[s] it [all] to [the attention of] Administration,
[the Administration] will ship [*4] [Plaintiff] to [a] mental
[hospital.] And NASA plays a big part in shutting them down. But to no
avail." Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),
Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996).
Congress's purpose in enacting the PLRA was "primarily to curtail
claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act . . . many of which are routinely dismissed as legally
frivolous." Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996).
A crucial part of the congressional plan for curtailing meritless
prisoner suits is the requirement, embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), that a court must dismiss, at the earliest
practicable time, any prisoner actions that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from immune defendants.
However, in determining the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must
be mindful to construe it liberally in favor [*5] of the plaintiff.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court
should "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School
Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court need not, however,
lend credit to a pro se plaintiff's "bald assertions" or "legal
conclusions." Id.
B. Fanciful, Fantastic and Delusional Claims
The Supreme Court explained that a complaint is frivolous within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if the complaint lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). Section 1915(d)'s term
"frivolous," when applied to a complaint, embraces not only inarguable
legal conclusions but also fanciful factual allegations. See id. The
Section accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the power to
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions [*6] are clearly
baseless. See id.; Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). In accordance with the Supreme Court's
guidance articulated in Neitzke and Denton, courts across the nation
dismissed claims based on sets of facts that were qualified as
"fanciful, fantastic and delusional." See Simmons v. Payne, 2006 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6796 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2006) (an assertion of a vast
conspiracy by all levels of the state government and federal government
was manifestly frivolous); Huey v. Raymond, 53 Fed. Appx. 329 (6th Cir.
2002) (an inmate's claim that his food was poisoned by numerous prison
employees, resulting in various ailments, was properly dismissed as
irrational, wholly beyond belief, and the product of delusion); Brock
v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952 (4th Cir. Va. 1997) (court rejected the
inmate's claims that he was being poisoned by an ingredient in the
prison pancake syrup); Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. Okla.
1995) (a claim that all judges of the circuit and an attorney conspired
to deny prisoner's access to the court was properly denied as
frivolous); Allen v. Children's Servs. Div., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 34415
[*7] (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1993) (a father's complaint alleging that the
entire children's services department engaged in sexual conduct with
his daughter was frivolous); Taylor v. Bunnell, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
16889 (9th Cir. June 28, 1993) (dismissal of prisoner's claim alleging
that prison authorities drained his body fluids with carpet cleaning
machine was affirmed because his claims were fanciful, fantastic,
delusional, and clearly lacked an arguable basis in law or fact);
Callahan v. Beaman, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4211 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1993)
(where the complaint alleged that the conspiracy was part of a larger
scheme with the Seventh Day Adventists to get full control of one of
the plaintiffs, the district court properly found the complaint to be
frivolous and dismissed the action); Punchard v. New Mexico, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1923 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 1992) (inmate's complaint, in which
he claimed state officials had no right to hold or charge him because
he was the head of a foreign government, the Emperor of the Royal
Democratic State of Continental Africa Kingdom, was frivolous); O'Neal
v. Unknown Oakland Circuit Judge, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9972 [*8]
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2006) (where the claim asserted prolonged judicial
conspiracy, the "allegations had a paranoid quality that made them
difficult to accept as true").
In the same vein, the courts in the Third Circuit dismissed fanciful,
fantastic and delusional allegations. See Armstead v. Briggs, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3588 (D. Del. Feb. 17, 2004) (dismissing the claim
requesting that the court set up an appointment for the plaintiff with
President George W. Bush so that she could tell him that she had filed
a lawsuit seeking his permanent appointment as the President of the
United States); Noble v. Becker, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 480 (D. Del.
Jan. 15, 2004) (the claims that the government officials and others had
engaged in a vast conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights was
clearly delusional); Williams v. Werster, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8901
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (plaintiff's claim that he had uncovered
evidence of a conspiracy by the former mayor to commit sabotage and
espionage in order to establish ecclesiastical law and in some way
interfering with U.S. commerce were fanciful, fantastic, or
delusional); Robinson v. Love, 155 F.R.D. 535, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7503 (E.D. Pa. 1994) [*9] (where plaintiff alleged that his relatives,
neighbors, and friends were being held hostage by prison staff members,
and that he was subjected to witchcraft and attempts to poison him with
cyanide, the allegations were described as fanciful, fantastic, or
delusional scenarios). In accord with the above-cited decisions by the
courts in this Circuit and other national courts, this Court holds that
Plaintiff's Complaint describes fanciful, fantastic, or delusional
scenarios which stand genuinely outside the common experience of
humankind, and should be dismissed as irrational or wholly incredible.
n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Moreover, Plaintiff's claim against Judge Baxton cannot be
entertained since Judge Baxton is protected by absolute immunity with
respect to all acts that the Judge performs within her judicial
capacity. The well-established doctrine of judicial immunity has been
adhered to by the Supreme Court for more than a century. See Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871). Judicial immunity bestows
upon judges absolute immunity from suit for acts performed in their
judicial capacity. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S. Ct.
496, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1985). Judicial immunity is "essential to
protect the integrity of the judicial process" because it allows judges
to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without fear that
they will be subjected to vexatious or frivolous litigation. Id. at
200. Similarly, claims against G.P.S. cannot be entertained since
G.P.S. is not a state actor. To recover against a defendant under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted
under "color of [state] law" to deprive him of a right secured by the
federal Constitution or laws. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 1983 does not create substantive
rights; rather, it provides an avenue of recovery for the deprivation
of established federal constitutional and statutory rights. See Kneipp
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996); Groman, 47 F.3d at 633.
"The color of state law . . . is a threshold issue; there is no
liability under [Section] 1983 for those not acting under color of
law." Id. at 638. The color of state law element in a section 1983
action requires that "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of
[the plaintiff's rights] be fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482
(1982). For the conduct to be "fairly attributable" to the State, (1)
the deprivation must be caused by (a) the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or (b) by a rule of conduct imposed by
it or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and (2) the
defendant must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor,
either because the person (a) is a state official, (b) acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or (c)
performed conduct otherwise chargeable to the State. See id. at 936-39.
None of Plaintiff's allegations suggest that G.P.S. is a state actor.
Moreover, this Court's attempts to detect such entity as "Global Polite
Satellite" proved fruitless leading the Court to conclude that the
entity is nothing but a figment of Plaintiff's imagination.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [*10]
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Since
Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim bearing no relations to experiences
of humankind and describing fanciful, fantastic, or delusional
scenarios, Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
JOEL A. PISANO
United States District Judge
Dated: April 17, 2006